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We are living in the "Information Revolution", where development of powerful 
communication systems and digital technologies have resulted in the buildup of massive 
information banks by government, industries and even individuals, which are required to be 
protected to maintain privacy, confidentiality, availability and integrity of national and 
commercial information. It has also allowed for automation of services and such systems must 
protect customers against modern day "electronic crimes". The first part of this thesis is a 
study into the aspect of the development of secure communication between group of entities. 
The thesis gives an overview of the general issues that are raised by the concept of 
cryptosystems, followed by discussions on the methods currently available for the conduct of 
such techniques. Generic categories of threats and vulnerabilities to computer networks are 
outlined as well as network security objectives. The study culminates in the description of a 
recommended alternative approach for the development of Group Oriented Cryptosystems 
(GOC) which can be used to solve the problem of entity authentication and subsequent key 
distribution in order to enhance multiple-entity (group of entities) communications with 
confidentiality and integrity services. 
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E-mail securi ty i s  about protecting electronic  mails from spies, interlopers, and spoofs. 
People who may want to destroy, alter, or just look at our private communications. The second 
part of the thesis shows how we can protect the financial information, contract negoti ations, or 
personal correspondence we entrust to public or private networks by means of Digital 
Envelop. Furthermore, the model developed can be practically implemented. 
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ANALISIS KESELAMATAN RANGKAIAN KOMUNlKASI KOMPUTER 
Oleh 
LAW AN AHMED GUMEL 
Mei, 1999 
Pengerusi: Leow Soo Kar, Ph.D 
Fakulti: Sains dan Pengajian Alam Sekitar 
Era "Revolusi Maklumat" terkeni memperlihatkan bagaimana pembangunan sistem 
komunikasi yang teguh berserta dengan teknologi digital telah menghasilkan pembinaan bank 
maklumat yang gergasi oleh p ihak kerajaan, industri serta para individu. Justeru itu 
perlindungan untuk memelihara kerahsiaan, keyakinan, kesediaan dan kewibawaan maklumat 
nasional dan komersial diperlukan. Kedua-dua ini juga telah membenarkan sistem layanan 
secara automasi yang mana sistem seperti ini perlu melindungi pelanggan daripada "jenayah 
electronik"zaman moden. Bahagian pertama tesis ini mel iputi kaj ian mengenai aspek 
pembangunan komunikasi keselamatan diantara beberapa entiti. Tesis ini juga memberikan 
secara keseluruhan isi umum yang timbul dari konsep kriptosistem, diikuti dengan 
perbincangan keatas kaedah yang tersedia ada untuk mengendalikan teknik kriptosistem ini. 
Rangkaian komputer sentiasa terdedah dari beberapa ancaman dan berada dalam keadaan 
bahaya. Justeru itu beberapa kategori ancaman generik dan keadaan bahaya ini disenaraikan. 
Juga digariskan objektif keselamatan rangkaian. Suatu pendekatan altematif bagi 
membangunkan Kumpulan Berorientasikan kriptosistem disarankan. Kaedah ini boleh 
digunakan untuk menyelesaikan masalah ketulinan entiti dan taburan jujukan kunci. Yang 
demikian keyakinan dan kewibawaan terhadap layanan komunikasi entiti berbilang akan 
meningkat. 
Xlii 
Keselamatan e-mai l  memperihalkan perlindungan mel elektronik daripada pengintip, 
orang yang tidak berkenaan dan penipu yang mana mereka ini mungkin  ingin menghapus, 
menukar atau mencerobohi komunikasi sulit kita. Bahagian kedua tesis memperlihatkan 
bagaimana kita boleh melindungi maklumat kewangan, kontrak perbincangan atau rangkaian 
suli t ini melalui Selubungan Digital. Selanjutnya model yang dibangunkan boleh di laksanakan 
secara praktik. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea that we are l iving in a new era, in which our economy, society, culture and 
political l ife are increasingly shaped by computers and communications, goes back about 
forty years. In the past years a series of remarkable developments have confirmed that 
Marshall McLuhan was right " we are l iving in a global village" (Donald, 1990). Computer 
and communication technologies are indisputable at the heart of many strong forces that are 
reshaping the world and our perception of it. 
The fields of telecommunications and networking have, in particular, witnessed more 
significant developments than many other fields of human knowledge. This is primarily due 
to the fact that telecommunication is the engine that is driving the information age into our 
daily lives, as compared to the forces that brought us the agricultural and industrial ages 
earlier. Telecommunications and networking have been growing at an explosive rate, and all 
indications are for their continued growth. Some of the major factors influencing this 
phenomenal growth are technology driven. Developments such as fiber optics, Local Area 
Networks (LAN), Wide Area Networks (WAN), digital and switching techniques and 
satellite technology have all contributed towards reduction in the cost of communication. 
Globalization of business services and the need to coordinate manufacturing, marketing 
services, and financial activities over large distances are also contributing to the importance 
and growth of telecommunications and computer communications. Many corporations have 
discovered the use of telecommunication-based system and computer networks for their 
transactions. Furthermore, it will enable a firm to build strategic information resources that 
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allows i t  to take adv antage and to confront competitiv e forces i n  the m arket. Growth will 
continue in  electronic  m ai l  systems  (Harper, 1989). Similar observation have envisaged in 
electronic  data interchange (EDI), voice-mail, facsimile, electronic  m eeting systems (EMS), 
teleconferencing, telecommuting, electronic funds transfer (EFT) and various electronic  
communications systems (O'Brien, 1993). These developments have increased the market 
size which, in tum, have contributed to price reductions. 
The Need for Computer Networks 
Networks satisfy a broad range of purposes and meet various requi rements. Some of 
the common objectives of computer communication networks are: 
1 .  Cost savings, greater availability of software, easier use and maintenance as well as 
higher performances. 
2. Sharing of (distance) resources such as information (databases) or processors (CPUs). 
Modem organizations today are widely dispersed, a network provides the means to 
exchange data among computers at a diverse part of a country and the world, and to make 
programs and data available to the diverse workers of the enterpri se. 
3 .  To provide interprocess communication, such as among users (or processes) and 
processors, or the work on one computer can be reloaded through the network onto another 
computer in the network. 
4. To improve reliability of networks through redundancy . Networking also supports the 
cri tical function of backup in case a computer fails or m alfunctions, the backup computer 
can then take over. 
5. Distribution of processing functions. For example, a transaction i s  translated in  one node, 
processed in another, and the response formatted in a thi rd node. 
6. Furnish central control for a geographically distributed system,  such as inventory 
management in the manufacturing industry, managing prices and sales, and handling 
accounts etc. 
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7. To provide centralized management and allocation of network resources: host processors, 
associated databases, transmission facilities, and the l ike. 
8 .  It provides compatibility of dissimilar equipment and software. 
9. It also provides an efficient means of transporting large volume of data among remote 
locations. The use of networking allows a very flexible working environment. Employees 
can work at home by using terminals l inked through networks into the computer at the 
office. 
Computer and Network Security 
We will first examine alternative definitions of computer security and then narrowing 
the definitions toward more formal definition. 
Valuable information of any kind needs protection f rom unauthorised access and/or 
a lteration. In the case of computer data, thi s means more than placing a padlock on a door. 
In the early days of computing, computer security was of l ittle concern. The number of 
computers and the number of people with access to those computers was l imited (Amoroso, 
1994). The first computer security problems, however, emerged as early as the 1950 's, 
when computers began to be used for classified information. 
Confidentiality (also termed secrecy) was the primary security concern, and the primary 
threats were espionage and the invasion of privacy. At that time and up until recently, 
computer security was primarily a mil itary problem, which was viewed as essential ly  being 
synonymous with information security. From this perspective, security is obtained by 
protecting the information itself. 
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By the late 1960's, the sharing of computer resources and information, both within a 
computc�r and across networks, presented additional security problems. Computer systems 
with multiple users required operating systems that could keep users from intentionally or 
inadvertently interfering with each other (Garftnkel and Spafford, 1996). Network 
connections also provided additional potential avenues of attack that could not generally be 
secured physically. Disclosure of information was no longer the only security concern. 
Added to this was concern over maintaining the integrity of the information. Conventional 
wisdom dating from this period was that governments are primarily concern with preventing 
the disclosure of information, while businesses are primarily concerned with protecting the 
integrity of the information, although this is becoming less the case (Amoroso, 1 994). 
Defining Computer and Network Security 
In their popular text on Internet security and ftrewalls, (Cheswick and BeUovin, 1994), 
deftne computer security to be "keeping anyone from doing things you do not want them to do 
to, with, on, or from your computers or any peripheral devices ." Using this deftnition, 
computers are seen to be targets that can be attacked ("do to"), or tools that can be used ("do 
. . .  with., on, or from") . From this perspective, computer security is distinguished from 
information security. "Computer security is not a goal, it is a means toward a goal: 
information security. 
A more operational deftnition is presented by (Garftnkel and Spafford, 1996) in their text 
on Unix and Internet security: "A computer is secure if you can depend on it and its software 
to behave as you expect . . . This concept is often called trust: you trust the system to 
preserve and protect your data." The authors intend for this deftnition to include natural 
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disasters and buggy software as security concerns, but to exclude s��t and 
testing issues. 
These definitions are relatively infonnal, and as a result, they are not adequate to the 
development of a taxonomy of computer security problems. Ideally, a definition would 
unambiguously demarcate the boundaries of the field of concern. For example, natural 
disasters and buggy software both can result in damage to computer files, and therefore, a 
very broad definition of computer security would include both of these. As a practical matter, 
however, the computer security field is not usually considered to be this inclusive. Garfinkel 
and Spafford include these concerns in their definition of computer security, but they narrow 
their focus on "techniques to help keep your system safe from other people - including both 
insiders and outsiders, those bent on destruction, and those who are simply ignorant or 
untrained." 
Narrowing the Definitions 
There are many events that could result in damage to or loss of computer files that are 
included in the broad, infonnal definitions of computer security, but they are more 
appropriately considered as part of related security fields. Theft of computer equipment 
would cel1ainly result in the loss of computer files, but this type of theft is similar to the theft 
of the copy machine, telephone, jewelry, or any other physical object. Methods to provide 
security £::>r physical objects are well developed and are not unique to computer equipment. 
Environmental threats, such as earthquakes, floods, lightning, power fluctuations, humidity, 
dust, varying temperatures, and fire, can also result in damage to computer files, but they also 
can cause damage to other property. It seems customary for authors to include these threats 
within their broad computer security definitions, but they then proceed to exclude discussions 
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of these problems in their texts or papers on computer security. The defmition of computer 
security developed here is intended to explicitly exclude these areas. 
Another similar area involves software. "Buggy" software is certainly a threat to 
computer files. Improperly implemented software could cause files to be damaged or lost. 
But this does not, of course, mean that we should include software development as a subset of 
the computer security field. Most software development issues, instead, fall outside of the 
computl�r security field. Software errors, however, clearly lead to security problems: they 
sometimes create vulnerabilities that can then be exploited. In fact, software that operates 
correctly can also be a security problem when it is operated in a manner not intended. 
A common method to narrow the definition of computer security is to concentrate on the 
three categories of computer security. According to (Chales, 1996): Computer security 
consists of maintaining three characteristics: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. 
Confidentiality requires that information be accessible only to those authorized for it, 
Integrity requires that information remain unaltered by accidents or malicious attempts, and 
Availability means that the computer system remains working without degradation of access 
and provides resources to authorized users when they need it. However, in recent years, more 
and mOire reported instances of computer system vulnerabilities and attacks have been 
recognized or noticed that cannot be easily associated with one of disclosure, integrity, or 
denial of service (Amoroso, 1994). 
Mon:;:over, this concentration focuses computer security on the protection of computer 
files, and ensuring the availability of the computer and network system. This focus is too 
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narrow for at least two reasons. First, many attackers indeed are attempting to use process 
access to gain access to files, but many are simply after the process access itself. 
The other reason this focus is too narrow is found in the security architecture of Unix­
based computer systems, where security is based on protection of objects, which includes both 
processe:s and files. Access to processes is commonly restricted by accounts to which the user 
must log in, such as by entering the correct user name and password. Once an attacker gains 
access to a process, then the process must be used to gain access to files. In other words, 
access to a file system requires two steps: access to a process, then access to the file. This is 
illustrated by a typical Unix process, such as the /bin/cp utility (used to copy files). A user 
gets acce:ss to this utility upon successfully logging into an account. Access to the /binlcp 
utility, however, does not mean that the user can now use this process to copy any file. When 
a process runs, it may access only a limited collection of files that are associate with the user 
(Tanenbaum, 1992). The user may, therefore, use the /binlcp utility only to copy files for 
which that user has the appropriate permission. 
In addition to using processes to access files, processes may also be used to access data 
that is in transit across a network. In this case, these data are not contained in files which 
would be located in primary memory (the computer's volatile random-access memory), or in 
secondary memory (storage disks). They are instead a stream of data packets in transit. 
These can be accessed by processes operating at the origin host for the data transmissions, at 
the destination host, or at hosts in between through which the data pass. 
In sununary, conceptualizing computer security as being based on providing 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability in a computer system narrows the focus to the Jiles 
in a system. Confidentiality and integrity specifically refer to the prevention of disclosure, 
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alteration or deletion of the information contained in computer files. As discussed above, 
however, this is only one of the levels of access in a typical computer security system. 
Access controls are used to restrict access to processes, files, and data in transit. 
The Need for Secure Networks 
A secure network is critical for the survival and success of many businesses, as it has 
become an integral part of businesses, and it is hard to separate the risks to networks from 
the risks to the businesses. This accelerating growth on networks has vastly exceeded the 
corresponding improvements to ensure their security. Moreover, it also continues to expose 
new loops and vulnerabilities in network security issues. Many security attacks take place 
on networks. Ryan and Bordoloi (1997) reported that conservative estimates of annual 
losses due to security breaches stands at about US $80 million. Some survey firms indicate 
that the losses may actually be in billions of dollars, they also indicated that another study 
shows that a single breach in security can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Ahuja 
(1996) reported that, according to the Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie 
Mellon University, they receive an average of three new computer security incidents every 
day. They presented some startling statistics, that by January 1995, the number of viruses 
had increased to approximately 6000, a 40% increase in 12 months. According to (Dr. 
Solomon, 1998), the number of viruses now (1998) is more than 20,000 (refer to Chapter II 
for details). In 1992, cheque frauds cost the financial services industry over US $ 1  billion, 
while credit card fraud cost the industry over US $3.5 billion. The number of reported 
hacker invasions increased from 252 in the year 1990 to 2341 in the year 1 994. While 
downtime at a major banking data center cost approximately US $5000 per second, yet the 
total loss resulting from security breaches is still unknown. 
• 
• 
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Some Statistics 
The FBI estimates that there is a US $7.5 billion annual loss to electronic attack . 
According to the Wall Street Journal 21/8/95, "Russian computer hackers successfully 
breached a large number of Citicorp corporate accounts stealing US $400,000 and 
illegally transferring US $11.6 million" 
• The Times of 3/6/96 reported that hackers had been paid £400 mil lion in extortion 
money to keep quiet about having electronically invaded banks, brokerage firms, and 
investment houses in London and New York with 'logic bombs'. 
• US department of defense report found that 88% of their computers were penetrable. In 
96% of the cases where their tiger teams got in, the intrusions were undetected. Note 
that the DoD are really seriously concerned with security. 
• In 1984, a bank funds transfer netted $25 million for a branch manager who 
manipulated a computer system by entering offsetting entries that evaded auditing 
(Rusell and Gangemi, 1 991). 
Electronic Mail 
Electronic Mail is an electronic communications system that is used to send 
information from one person/site to another (one-to-one communication), or from one to 
many people at the same time (called broadcasting or one-to-many communications). 
Depending on the system used, electronic messages can comprise data, text, audio, or 
graphic information. However, unlike regular letters that are written on paper and sent via 
the postal service, "electronic letters" and "electronic packages" are entered into a terminal 
and then transmitted electronically, arriving almost instantaneously instead of taking a day 
or more to reach their destination. Electronic mail facilitates communication and 
information exchange in a multitude of ways and touches every aspect of the 
communications industry. 
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E-mail is not the only fonn of electronic messaging. The telephone is another, as is 
the facsimile (fax) and telex. Each of these fonns can operate independently. Individuals use 
E-mail because it is fast and reliable, and sometimes even because it is cheaper than a long­
distance telephone call. However, the E-mail cost mentioned does not include whatever 
amortized cost there would be of the tenninal or computer to send the message or the portion 
of the telephone costs that could be shared. 
E-mail will not be the only fonn of communication in the future, of course. Nor will it 
be the only fonn of mail. Different media have different strengths, so many will survive. 
Paper mail, or "snail mail" "s it is known to E-mail enthusiasts, will still be ideal for 
conveying a personal, concrete touch. Voice calls and voice mail will carry intonations and 
emotion that E-mail cannot match; fax machines will print a letter even where there is no 
computer to receive E-mail, and so on. 
Reasons for E-mail 
E-mail has corne a long way since it was the plaything of bearded researchers 
working the midnight shift in university computer centers. Companies have adopted it all over 
the world, to connect people inside the company to one another as well to those outside the 
company. In fact, some studies show that the number of business E-mail messages are 
increasing exponentially. Imagine a business without telephones. This is practically 
impossilble. Many analysts think E-mail will become equally as basic to business as telephone. 
E-mail could become a main corridor to move infonnation such as job orders, personal 
instructions, and engineering suggestions. 
